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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Missouri legislature has taken significant steps to-
ward adapting the requirements of probate to the needs of the modest es-
tate while retaining certain essential protective provisions.' In doing so, the
legislature has reacted to a growing concern of the average citizen: how to
pass one's property at death in a quick, cost-efficient manner.
Missouri courts similarly have acknowledged the necessity of adapting
the succession laws to the needs and desires of low- to middle-income per-
sons. In the past decade, Missouri courts have been particularly active in
the area of bank accounts as will substitutes. A significant step in this direc-
tion has been the judicial liberalization of requirements for survivorship
rights in joint savings accounts.2 This has resulted in the recognition of the
1. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 473.480-.843 (Supp. 1982) (providing for in-
dependent administration of estates); see generally Borron, Independent Administration
and Other Probate Matters Under the New Code, 37 J. Mo. B. 13 (1981); Hanna, Probate
Law and Succession Taxes: Missouri Leaps Forward, 49 UMKC L. REV. 170 (1981).
2. See In re Estate of LaGarce, 487 S.W.2d 493, 500-01 (Mo. en banc 1972).
The LaGarce court arrived at a new interpretation of Mo. REV. STAT. § 369.150
(1978), which pertains to joint accounts in savings and loan associations. Prior to
LaGarce, the section had been interpreted as raising a rebuttable presumption that
the depositor intended to create a joint tenancy when he made a deposit in joint
form. This could be rebutted with evidence that the depositor intended some other
disposition, requiring the donee to produce evidence of delivery and donative in-
1
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joint savings account as a practical will substitute, enabling a person to pass
funds outside of probate.3
This need for adapting the law of succession to the needs of the average
citizen was also the catalyst for the development of the Totten trust doc-
trine. In the early 1900's, New York courts recognized that the savings ac-
count trust was generally used to avoid the inconveniences of making a will
and thus was simply a will substitute. The depositor intended to retain full
control over the account until death, at which time the money would pass
to a named beneficiary without the expense and delay of probate. Missouri
courts, in attempting to streamline probate requirements and permit the
use of savings accounts as will substitutes, have purported to adopt the Tot-
ten trust doctrine.
5
This Comment will address the historical treatment of the Totten trust
in Missouri and the recent Missouri decisions that purport to adopt it. The
focus will be on whether the doctrine has actually been adopted and
whether the courts have correctly applied it. Initially, however, a review of
the Totten trust doctrine is in order.
II. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS BIRTH
A Totten trust is typically created by a deposit in a savings or banking
institution account6 in the name of "A, in trust for B."7 The depositor, A, is
tent. The LaGarce court overruled these prior decisions, finding that they violated
the plain meaning of the statute, and concluded that compliance with the statute
established a statutory joint tenancy in the account, unaffected by a showing that
the common law elements of a gift were not present. 487 S.W.2d at 500-01. See also
Joint Bank Accounts-Right of Survivorship, 39 Mo. L. REV. 270, 273-74 (1974).
3. 39 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 275.
4. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 124, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); Estes, In Search
of a Less Tentative Totten, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 21, 25 (1977); LarremoreJudicial
Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L.J. 312, 316 (1905).
5. See Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113-14
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910, 916
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
6. Although the Totten trust is most often found in the context of savings
account deposits, it also has been held to be created by certificates of deposit
purchased in trust for another. See, e.g., Nace v. Fulton Cty. Nat'l Bank, 79 Pa. D.
& C. 325, 327-28 (C.P. 1951); Estes, supra note 4, at 22 n.1; f. In re Estate of Blier,
75 Misc. 2d 436, 437, 347 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-97 (Sur. Ct. 1973) (mutual fund certifi-
cate with designated beneficiary sufficiently analogous to Totten trust to make it
available for payment of funeral and administration expenses of insolvent estate).
7. The title of the account may vary and no particular form is required so
long as there is a basis for finding that the depositor intended to create a trust. See
Estes, supra note 4, at 22 n.2; cf. In re Ellis' Estate, 178 Misc. 491, 494, 34 N.Y.S.2d
884, 887 (Sur. Ct.) (Totten trust doctrine applied where account title did not con-
tain words "in trust"), af'd mem., 264 A.D. 846, 36 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1942); Nace v.
Fulton Cty. Nat'l Bank, 79 Pa. D. & C. 325, 328-29 (C.P. 1951) (certificate of de-
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both the settlor and the trustee. The deposit must be of his own money.8 In
a Totten trust, the mere form of the deposit gives rise to the presumption
that the depositor intended to create a revocable trust.9 As such, the trust
may be revoked at any time during A's life, and he retains full control and
posit held "for" another without using words "in trust"). The importance of the
form or title of the account, however, does not seem to rest on its evidentiary nature.
The value of the Totten decision is that it not only recognized the possibility of a
revocable savings account trust, but further indicated that a deposit in the deposi-
tor's name as trustee for another will be presumed a revocable trust. In re Totten,
179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904). Thus, many jurisdictions have held
that the mere form of the deposit creates a presumption that a revocable trust was
intended. 1 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.1, at 520 (3d ed. 1967). This
presumption relieves the beneficiary from initially having to prove the depositor's
intent. The phrase "Totten trust doctrine," as used in this Comment, connotes this
presumption arising from the mere form of the deposit.
8. If the depositor does not own the money or is not authorized by the owner
to use the money in opening the account, a Totten trust is not created. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Dillon, 441 Pa. 206, 209, 272 A.2d 161, 162 (1971); Brose Estate, 416 Pa.
386, 397, 206 A.2d 301, 307 (1965). At least one Missouri case has agreed with this
position. See First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1980).
9. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment a (1959); 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 7,
§ 58. 1, at 520. It is generally recognized that when a deposit is made in the form "A
in trust for B," the depositor may have one of three possible intentions: (1) not to
create a trust at all; (2) to create an irrevocable trust; or (3) to create a revocable
trust. I A. SCOTT, supra note 7, § 58.1, at 519-20. If there is no evidence of the
depositor's actual intent, different jurisdictions will presume different intentions.
For example, in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas, extrinsic evidence of intent is re-
quired; absent that proof, the presumption is that no trust was intended. See, e.g.,
Day Trust Co. v. Malden Say. Bank, 328 Mass. 576, 5 78-79, 105 N.E.2d 363, 364-65
(1952); Hogarth-Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 397, 2 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1936);
Scleifstein v. Greenstein, 9 Mass. App. 344, -, 401 N.E.2d 379, 385-86 (1980); In re
Estate of Hoffman, 175 Ohio St. 363, 367, 195 N.E.2d 106, 109-10 (1963); Fleck v.
Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 346-47, 172 S.W.2d 975, 978 (1943); Citizens' Nat'l Bank v.
Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Trex. Civ. App. 1979). But see McLaughlin,Joint Ac-
counts, Totten Trusts, and the Poor Man s Will, 44 TEx. B.J. 871, 874 (1981) (stating
that Totten trust doctrine has statutory recognition in Texas). In Maine, the pre-
sumption is that an irrevocable trust was intended. See, e.g., Rose v. Osborne, 133
Me. 497, 502, 180 A. 315, 318 (1935); Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 246, 110
A. 359, 361 (1920). In most states, however, the presumption is that a revocable
trust was intended. See, e.g., Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 429, 4 S.E.2d 199, 201
(1939); Walso v. Latterner, 143 Minn. 364, 366, 173 N.W. 711, 712 (1919); In re
Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa.
424, 428-29, 169 A. 106, 108 (1933). While it is unclear whether the form of deposit
alone is sufficient in some states, those states will enforce the trust if there is evi-
dence that the depositor intended a revocable trust. 1 A. ScOTT, supra note 7,
§ 58.3, at 528-29 (listing states in which Totten trust has been upheld).
1983]
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use of the fund.' The trust may be revoked by any manifestation of an
intent to revoke by the depositor, including withdrawals from the ac-
count." A withdrawal by the depositor is a revocation only to the extent of
that withdrawal.' 2 At the depositor's death, the trust becomes absolute.
The named beneficiary is immediately entitled to the remaining balance in
the account.' 3 If the beneficiary predeceases the depositor, the trust is ter-
minated.' 4 This presumption of revocability may be rebutted by showing
that the depositor did not intend to create a trust at all or that the trust was
intended to be irrevocable.'
5
The Totten trust doctrine was a "radical innovation"'" of the New
York courts.' 7 In the mid-nineteenth century, when the popularity of the
savings account was first recognized,'" a deposit in the form of "A, in trust
for B" was construed as creating only an irrevocable trust. The New York
decisions of that era also required that there be extrinsic evidence of the
depositor's intent to create a trust.' 9 The depositor was seen as having only
10. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); 1 A. ScoTr,
supra note 7, § 58.2, at 525.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959); 1 A.
SCOTT, supra note 7, § 58.4, at 535-36. Although the depositor theoretically may be
shown to have revoked the trust by oral declaration, the burden of proving such a
revocation is a very heavy one. It is rarely satisfied. See, e.g., Litsey v. First Fed,
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Tampa, 243 So. 2d 239, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); In re
Deneff's Will, 44 Misc. 2d 947, 949-50, 255 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349-50 (Sur. Ct. 1964);
Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 487, 522-24 (1972); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1259-60 (1954).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959).
13. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 126, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
14. Inre Bulwinkle, 107 A.D. 331,333, 95 N.Y.S. 176, 177-78 (1905); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959); see also 1 A. SCOTT, supra note
7, § 58.4, at 536-37 (beneficiary's estate is not entitled to the deposit).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment a (1959); 1 A. SCOTT,
supra note 7, § 58.1, at 536-37. A deposit in the form "A in trust for B" is ambigu-
ous since the testator can have three possible intentions. See note 9 supra. Because
of this ambiguity, the parol evidence rule does not exclude extrinsic evidence of the
testator's intent. See, e.g., Schuck Estate, 419 Pa. 466, 470, 214 A.2d 629, 631 (1965);
Brose Estate, 416 Pa. 386, 395, 206 A.2d 301, 307 (1965).
16. Larremore, supra note 4, at 316.
17. See Estes, supra note 4, at 45 (arguing that Totten trust is judicial abroga-
tion of common law and changes are responsibility of courts, not legislature).
18. See Note, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 686, 687-88 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Martin v. Funk, 75 N.Y. 134 (1878). Professor Scott interpreted
Martin as follows:
[A] trust of a savings bank deposit can be created without delivery of the
bank book to the beneficiary and without communication to him of the
intention to create a trust, provided that there was evidence of the deposi-
tor's intention to create a trust other than the mere form of the deposit.
[Vol. 48
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TO7TEN TRUSTS
two possible intentions: (1) creation of an irrevocable trust, relinquishing
title to and use of the money; or (2) creation of no trust at all.2 ° Since the
savings account trust was construed as irrevocable, the named beneficiary
could surcharge the estate for any amounts the depositor had withdrawn.
2 1
This approach greatly diminished the desirability of savings account trusts
as will substitutes.
After the turn of the century, however, the New York Court of Appeals
decided that a new construction of the savings account trust was required.
In In re Totten,22 the court announced the new rule:
A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name as
trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevoca-
ble trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the
gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as
delivery of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the
depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some
decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises
that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the
death of the depositor.23
The Totten trust was born. Subsequent New York cases upheld the Totten
trust against the claim that it was invalid as a testamentary disposition in
violation of the applicable statute of wills.24 Because of its utility as a will
substitute for the small estate and the unlikelihood of fraud, the Totten
trust was eventually adopted in a majority of jurisdictions.25
1 A. ScOTT, supra note 7, § 58.2, at 524.
20. See 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.2, at 524.
21. See Note, supra note 18, at 689.
22. 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
23. Id at 125-26, 71 N.E. at 752. The court reviewed its prior conflicting deci-
sions involving savings account trusts and stated, "It is necessary for us to settle the
conflict by laying down such a rule as will best promote the interests of all the
people in the state." Id at 125, 71 N.E. at 752.
24. See Murray v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 258 A.D. 132, 136, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915,
918-19 (1939); In re Yarme's Estate, 148 Misc. 457, 459, 266 N.Y.S. 93, 95 (Sur. Ct.
1933), afd mem., 242 A.D. 693, 273 N.Y.S. 403 (1943); see also I A. SCOTT, supra
note 7, § 58.3, at 527 (collecting cases). But cf In re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616,
620-21, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 628-29 (Sur. Ct. 1933) (trust sufficiently testamentary to
give depositor's creditors, funeral expenses, and administration expenses priority
over beneficiary).
25. See, e.g., Brucks v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 849-50,
228 P.2d 545, 548 (195 1); Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956); In re
Estate of Petralia, 32 Ill. 2d 134, 138, 204 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1965); First Fed. Say. & Loan
v. Baugh, 160 Ind. App. 102, 107, 310 N.E.2d 101, 104 (1974); Bollack v. Bollack,
169 Md. 407, 415-16, 182 A. 317, 320-21 (1936). Additional cases are collected in 1
A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 528 n.5. In many instances, however, it is unclear
1983]
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III. MISSOURI'S REACTION TO TorrENv: THE EVOLUTION
FROM INTENT TO FORM
A. Legislative Reaction
Soon after the Toten decision, Missouri enacted legislation regarding
savings account trusts. A 1909 provision enabled banks and trust compa-
nies to pay checks or orders signed by the depositor/trustee and drawn on a
deposit made by him in trust for another.2 6 A 1915 law allowed banks and
trust companies to pay the account to the named beneficiary on the death
of the depositor/trustee.2 7 But it was unclear whether these statutes were a
validation of the savings account trust with regard to the beneficiary's
rights in the account or were merely protective provisions for savings insti-
tutions in the event payment was made to the wrong party.
28
This uncertainty may have been eliminated by subsequent statutes
pertaining to trust account deposits in savings and loan associations.2 9 In
enacting these provisions, the legislature expressly stated that it did not in-
tend to make a determination "of the rights of persons interested in such
account as between themselves." 30 By analogy, it may be safe to say that
the legislature did not intend its prior provisions to determine the rights of
beneficiaries to the accounts.3 ' The question whether the Totten trust is to
be an effective will substitute has been left to the Missouri courts.
32
whether these courts are relying on the presumption of revocability or merely en-
forcing the depositor's apparent intent. Id § 58.1, at 520 n.3; id § 58.3, at 528-29.
Many jurisdictions have adopted statutes permitting the savings institution to
pay the named beneficiary of a savings account trust at the depositor's death. See,
e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1840 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.807 (West 1970);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.401 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 902 (West 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-704, -3-511 (1980); see also 1 A.
ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 530 n.7 (collecting statutes from other jurisdictions).
Professor Scott points out that such statutes usually have been construed as protec-
tive measures for the institution and not as determinations of the beneficiaries'
rights. Id § 58.3, at 530-31.
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 11929 (1909) (current version at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 362.480 (1978)).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 11779 (1919) (banks); id § 11840 (trust companies).
28. See Bank Deposits as Will Substitutes in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. REV. 482, 486
(1963).
29. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 369.154(2), .179 (1978).
30. Id § 369.179.4(3).
31. The majority of Missouri cases involving trust deposits have not addressed
the issue whether the statutes are merely protective provisions for the institution or
are determinations of the beneficiaries' rights in the deposit. See 28 Mo. L. REV.,
supra note 28, at 486.
32. In Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1981), the court stated that the effect of Mo. REV. STAT. § 369.179.4(3)
(1978) is not to "conclusively vest title in the beneficiary," but simply to allow evi-
dence to be introduced "to show that the trust has been revoked or disaffirmed."
[Vol. 48
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In examining the reaction of Missouri courts to the Totten trust, the
cases may be better analyzed by dividing them into two categories: those
rendered before 1980 and those rendered after 1980."3
1. The Pre-1980 Approach
Treatment of the Totten trust by Missouri courts during the years
before 1980 is unclear.3 4 It can even be said, with good reason, that Mis-
souri did not recognize the Totten trust at all.3 5 Since the crux of the Tot-
ten trust doctrine is that a presumption of a revocable trust is created by the
mere form of the deposit,3 6 a review of early cases demonstrates that the
presumption-and consequently the doctrine-was largely ignored.
Not long after the Totten decision, the Missouri Supreme Court decided
Haris Banking Co. v. Miller." Although Miller involved an assignment of a
certificate of deposit to take effect upon the depositor's death 3' rather than
a savings account trust, the assignee's right to the deposit was sustained on a
trust theory.39 But the manner in which this trust was to be characterized is
unclear. The court did not describe it as revocable; instead, it seemed to
characterize it as an irrevocable trust subject to a reserved life estate in the
617 S.W.2d at 114. But the court in First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602
S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), used Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 362.475, 362.480,
369.154, 369.179 (1978), as evidence that the Totten trust has been recognized in
Missouri. 602 S.W.2d at 913.
33. The dividing point is the decision in First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns,
602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), the first Missouri decision expressly pur-
porting to adopt the Totten trust doctrine.
34. 39 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 272; f 28 Mo. L. REV., supra note 28, at
485 (stating that Missouri courts would probably follow Totten).
35. This was the contention advanced, as late as 1981, by the depositor's execu-
tor in Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1981).
36. 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.1, at 520.
37. 190 Mo. 640, 89 S.W. 629 (1905).
38. A deposit of $8,080 was originally made by the depositor in his own name
and a certificate of deposit was issued directly to him. After asking employees of the
bank how he could make his housekeeper, Helen Miller, the owner of the deposit at
his death, he complied with their suggestion that he assign it to her. Id at 653-54,
89 S.W. at 630-32. The depositor made the following endorsement: "For value
received I hereby assign this certificate to Helen A. Miller and authorize her to
draw the same. [Signed] Giles Burlinggame." Id at 660, 89 S.W. at 632. There
was also evidence that the depositor notified the housekeeper of the assignment but
told her that he was to have the use of the interest generated by the deposit. Id. at
656-58, 89 S.W. at 631-33.
39. Id. at 672, 89 S.W. at 638. The trial court's finding that an inter vivos gift
had been effected by the assignment was disapproved because there had been no
delivery. Id. at 663, 89 S.W. at 635.
1983]
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depositor as to the interest generated by the account.4°
The irrevocable characterization of the trust by the Miller court is rein-
forced by Citien-s National Bank v. McKenna.4 ' In McKenna, the depositor's
nephew asserted that a trust had been created by a savings account deposit,
the certificate to which stated that it was payable to the depositor or the
nephew.42 The court rejected the contention that a trust had been created,
pointing out that the depositor had never relinquished ownership and con-
trol over the deposit.43 The court distinguished Miller on the ground that
40. See id at 670-72, 89 S.W. at 637-38. The court stated that while a trust will
not be imposed on an imperfect gift, a trust may still be found when the donor
intended to make a complete disposition of the property subject to a retained life
estate in the income. Id. at 667, 89 S.W. at 637 (citing In re Soulard's Estate, 141
Mo. 642, 659, 43 S.W. 617, 621 (1897)). Further consideration of how the Miller
trust should be characterized illustrates the pitfalls encountered in using the savings
account as a will substitute. These pitfalls are the result of courts drawing distinc-
tions without differences. If the depositor in Miller intended that no interest in the
deposit should pass to the assignee until his death, he created, in effect, a payable on
death (POD) account. See 28 Mo. L. REV., supra note 28, at 486-87. Most states,
including Missouri, hold POD accounts invalid as testamentary dispositions. See,
e.g., Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400
(1945); Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949); Bank of Perryville v.
Kutz, 276 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App., St. L. 1955); In re Schultz's Estate, 152 N.Y.S.2d
959 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Kyle v. Groce, 50 N.C. App. 204, 272 S.E.2d 609 (1980); In re
Brown's Estate, 343 Pa. 230, 22 A.2d 821 (1941). Ironically, many of these states
will presume and uphold a revocable savings account trust when the deposit is in
the form "A in trust for B." See, e.g., Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199
(1939); Walso v. Latterner, 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711 (1919); In re Totten, 179
N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 A. 106 (1933). The
intended effect of both the POD account and the revocable savings account trust is
the same: the depositor retains the use of the deposit for life and any remaining
balance is to pass to a designated donee. Whether the transaction is valid depends
on the "magic" words used. See Morgan v. McLaughlin, 260 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Mann, J., dissenting) (such distinctions are "balderdash").
Although the Totten trust has been sustained as nontestamentary on the thory that
a present but defeasible interest passes to the beneficiary, see 1 A. ScoTr, supra note
7, § 58.3, at 527, this theoretical difference hardly justifies treatment different from
a POD account.
41. 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S.W. 521 (K.C. 1913).
42. Id at 255, 153 S.W. at 522. There was evidence that the depositor had
stated to the institution's cashier that he wanted the deposit to be "put in a certifi-
cate to bear interest, payable to my nephew, William McKenna, in the event I die,
or anything happens to me." Id at 256, 153 S.W. at 522. Cf. 1 A. ScoTT, supra
note 7, § 58.6, at 549 (joint account deposits can present situation analogous to
deposit "in trust" for another).
43. 168 Mo. App. at 257, 153 S.W. at 523. The court concluded that the form
of the certificate and the statements of the depositor indicated that "a testamentary
disposition was intended-a disposition only to become consummated at his death
[Vol. 48
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the earlier case had involved a final disposition of the fund." The McKenna
court apparently interpreted Miller as authorizing only irrevocable savings
account trusts.
These two decisions make it clear that Missouri courts were not view-
ing the savings account trust in the same light as the Toten court. In Mis-
souri, a revocable trust would not be presumed from the mere form of the
deposit. Although neither Miller nor McKenna dealt with Totten -type depos-
its, it is clear that the possibility of a revocable savings account trust was not
recognized in either decision. Miller indicated an approach similar to the
pre-Totten approach in New York: if the depositor intended to create a trust,
it would be enforceable only as an irrevocable trust.4 5 The implications of
McKenna-that a savings account over which the depositor retains control
during his lifetime is an invalid testamentary disposition, not a trust-is
wholly repugnant to the principles of the Totten trust. 6
From this foundation, the Missouri approach to the Totten trust be-
came confusing. Over the next sixty-seven years, courts repeatedly engaged
in a case-by-case search for extrinsic evidence of the depositor's intent and a
basis for distinguishing prior cases."' In each of these numerous cases, the
courts placed little importance on the form of the deposit; they looked
mainly at the depositor's intent as evidenced by his acts and statements. 48
without other direction, a condition incompatible with a trust." Id. at 258, 153
S.W. at 523.
44. Id at 258-59, 153 S.W. at 523. In other words, the McKenna court saw the
transaction in Miller as one in which the depositor had given up all beneficial inter-
est in the principal of the deposit, retaining only a right to use the interest generated
by the deposit. Consequently, if the depositor in Miller withdrew any of the princi-
pal, the assignee/beneficiary could surcharge his estate. See Note, supra note 18, at
689. On the other hand, the transaction in McKenna was viewed as one in which the
depositor intended to retain all beneficial interest until his death.
45. See Martin v. Funk, 75 N.Y. 134, 141-42 (1878); 1 A. SCOTr, supra note 7,
§ 58.2, at 524. This approach also seems to be the prevailing view in Maine. See
Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 502, 180 A. 315, 318 (1935). The Miller court relied
heavily on Hallowell Say. Inst. v. Titcomb, 96 Me. 62, 51 A. 249 (1901), which held
that a valid trust may be created by a savings account deposit even though the
depositor retains a life estate in the interest generated by the deposit. Id at 69-70,
51 A. at 251-52.
46. The Totten trust doctrine contemplates that the depositor will retain full
use and control of the account, and that control does not make the trust an invalid
testamentary disposition. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752
(1904); 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.2, at 525.
47. See 28 Mo. L. REV., supra note 28, at 486 (cases are impossible to reconcile;
courts rely on depositor's intent, not form of deposit).
48. A sampling of these cases is illustrative. In Frank v. Heimann, 302 Mo.
334, 347-48, 258 S.W. 1000, 1003-04 (en banc 1924), the court held that a checking
account deposit in the name of "Morris A. Heimann, trustee for Melba Heimann"
did not create a revocable trust. The court distinguished the reasoning in Miller on
the ground that the depositor intended to create a trust of funds to be accumulated
1983]
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Dispositions in the nature of Totten trusts were given effect in a few
appellate cases of this period.49 In each of them, emphasis was placed on
the depositor's statements that he intended, in effect, to create a revocable
savings account trust.5" The results in these cases may be attributed to the
in the future and not in any existing fund. In Clabbey v. First Nat'l Bank, 320
S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. App., K.C. 1959), a checking account in the name of the
depositor "or Thos. R. Clabbey" was held not to be a trust where the evidence
showed that the account was opened only for the purpose of allowing another to
draw funds for the benefit of the disabled depositor. The court stated that "no trust
results from the mere fact the account is established in the name of two or more
persons." Id at 741. In Bank of Perryville v. Kutz, 276 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1955), the court found no trust when the deposit was made in the depositor's
name, payable on death to another, since the failure to relinquish control over the
funds indicated that there was no intent to create a trust. In Butler State Bank v.
Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 913, 916-17 (Mo. App., K.C. 1959), a savings account in the
depositor's name, payable on death to the depositor's daughter, was held to be a
revocable trust where the testimony showed that the depositor intended to retain
the use of the account and to allow the daughter full use of it. The court distin-
guished Kutz on the grounds of the depositor's intent. Id at 916. In In re Geel's
Estate, 143 S.W.2d 327, 330-31 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940), the court found that a new
trial was warranted on the issue whether a revocable trust was created by a deposit
in a joint savings account where the testimony showed thatthe depositor intended
to reserve the use of the deposit for life and that while he withdrew part of the
principal, he quickly replaced it. And in Masterson v. Plummer, 343 S.W.2d 352
(Mo. App., Spr. 1961), the court found a trust was created under two certificates of
deposit, one payable to the order of the depositor "or Henry Masterson, Benefici-
ary" and the other payable to the order of the depositor "if living; if not living to
Henry Masterson, Beneficiary." The language of the certificates and the fact that
the principal remained intact indicated intent to create a trust. Id at 355-56. See
also Eschen v. Steers, 10 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1926) (no trust under Missouri law
when depositor intended to retain pass book and thus control of savings account in
daughter's name). It is not the intent of this Comment to evaluate the correctness
of these decisions or to imply that an inquiry into the depositor's intent is improper.
On the contrary, it is a fundamental part of the Totten trust doctrine that the
presumption of revocability created by the form of the deposit is rebuttable by evi-
dence of the depositor's contrary intent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58
comment a (1959); 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 7, § 58.1, at 520-23. But these cases do
show that Missouri courts have not engaged in any initial presumption of
revocability.
49. See Masterson v. Plummer, 343 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961);
Butler State Bank v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Mo. App., K.C. 1959).
50. A closer reading of Masterson and Duncan, however, reveals that neither in-
dicates that a Totten trust was deemed a nontestamentary disposition during this
period. In both cases, the courts emphasized that the depositor had not exercised
complete control over the deposit up to the moment of his death, thus indicating
that the beneficiary had been given a present equitable interest in the account. See
Masterson, 343 S.W.2d at 356 (that trust funds remained intact used as evidence of
intent); Duncan, 319 S.W.2d at 916 (depositor relinquished control of pass book
[Vol. 48
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confusing dictum of the Missouri Supreme Court in Frank v. Heimann."
The precise issue in Heimann was whether an irrevocable trust was created
by numerous deposits in an account entitled "Morris A. Heimann, trustee
for Melba Heimann." 52 The court correctly found that the depositor never
intended to divest himself of all rights in the deposits5 3 and that without
such intent an irrevocable trust could not have been created.54 The court
concluded its opinion, however, with dictum to the effect that the deposi-
tor's declaration that the account was to be his daughter's nest egg referred
to a fund "in the mere process of accumulation."5 5 Since the intended sub-
ject matter of the trust had not yet been acquired, the trust was wholly
executory and revocable.
56
If this dictum is a recognition of the Totten trust, two points arise.
First, it is a fundamental requirement of every trust that there be some
before death). The Totten trust, however, is sustained as nontestamentary on less
concrete grounds. It is, admittedly, a testamentary disposition; it is sustained for its
social utility, not because some present interest has passed to the beneficiary. See 1
A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 527. It is open to question whether the Masterson
and Duncan courts would have sustained the dispositions involved if the depositor
had been more active with the account.
Masterson and Duncan prove even more perplexing because both, in effect, in-
volved payable on death (POD) accounts. These cases seem irreconcilable with the
usual approach to POD accounts, which is that they are invalid testamentary dispo-
sitions. See, e.g., Bank of Perryville v. Kutz, 276 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. App., St. L.
1955). The Duncan court brought this confusion full circle by stating that the de-
posit involved in that case was actually a tentative or Totten trust, even though it
was in the form of a POD. 319 S.W.2d at 916 (distinguishing Kutz on grounds of
intent). The only way to explain this assertion is that the court was taking a posi-
tion similar to that suggested by a later Florida judge: forget form and give effeci to
whatever intent is found. See Morgan v. McLaughlin, 260 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Mann, J., dissenting) (noting that it is common knowledge
that one can pass a savings account at death without a will, but that few people
know the magic words).
51. 302 Mo. 334, 258 S.W. 1000 (En banc 1924).
52. The beneficiary was the daughter of the depositor. Evidence was presented
that the account was initially intended as a nest egg for the daughter, but after her
marriage hostility arose between father and daughter. Subsequently, the father
made a series of withdrawals from the account, leaving a balance of $1.44. The
daughter sued the father, contending that an irrevocable trust had been established
and that the father had converted the funds to his own use. She sought a lien on
the real estate purchased with those funds. Id at 338-39, 258 S.W. at 1000.
53. Id. at 344-45, 258 S.W. at 1003. This finding was largely based on the
depositor's own testimony that if he had intended to give up all title to the account,
his remaining assets would have afforded him just the bare necessities of life. Id
54. Id at 345, 258 S.W. at 1003.
55. Id. at 347-48, 258 S.W. at 1004.
56. Id The court further indicated that the depositor's personal use of the
funds operated as a revocation, but it did not state whether the beneficiary would
be entitled to the remaining $1.44 on deposit. See note 52 supra.
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definite or ascertainable trust property.57 In a Totten trust, that rule is
satisfied by viewing the account's balance as ascertainable trust property.5 8
The Heimann court, however, apparently did not accept this view, since it
found that there was no existing trust res.5 9 Consequently, it is confusing to
say that Heimann recognized the Totten trust since the court indicated that
such a trust would lack any ascertainable subject matter. 60
Second, confusion arises from the court's implication that where the
depositor/trustee intends to augment the trust by future deposits, the trust
is executory. An executory trust is one that requires some further act before
it is created.61 But the court did not indicate what further act must be
accomplished in order for the trust to be created. It is unclear whether the
court contemplated that this further act must be something by which the
depositor/trustee would relinquish all control over the account.
Both of these points lead to the further issue of when the trust actually
arises: at the time of deposit or at the depositor's death? The Heimann
court's view that the trust is executory when further deposits are intended
may be interpreted as meaning that the trust arises only at the depositor's
death. This conflicts, however, with the New York view that the trust arises
at the moment of deposit, subject to revocation. 6 2 In light of this, Heimann
57. See Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 377 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. en banc 1964); 1 A.
Scorr, supra note 7, § 76, at 684.
58. This also comports with the view that the trust arises at the moment of
deposit rather than at the moment of the depositor's death. 1 A. ScoTr, supra note
7, §§ 58.3, .4. See note 62 thfia.
59. 302 Mo. at 346, 258 S.W. at 1003.
60. The Heimann court did not discuss the Totten trust doctrine. If the court's
decision was based on that doctrine, it apparently did not perceive the doctrine as
the anomaly that it is. For example, the court not only indicated that there was no
ascertainable subject matter but also began its analysis with the proposition that a
completely executed voluntary trust is irrevocable unless the power of revocation is
expressly reserved. Id at 345, 258 S.W. at 1003. This traditional trust concept
conflicts with the Totten trust doctrine and nullifies the savings account trust as a
valid will substitute. See Note, supra note 18, at 691; Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49
VA. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1963).
61. Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 488, 291 S.W. 132, 134 (1927).
62. 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 527; id § 58.4A, at 541. But see Note,
supra note 18, at 690-93 (New York courts see the trust as arising at depositor's
death). The question whether the trust arises at the depositor's death or at the time
of the deposit is usually discussed in the context ofjustifying use of the Totten trust
as a testamentary disposition in violation of the applicable statute of wills. Profes-
sor Scott recognized that the New York view of the trust-as arising at the time of
the deposit-was a fiction but felt that the utility of the Totten trust justified it. I
A. Scor,supra note 7, § 58.3, at 527. He further argued that if the trust is going to
be upheld, it normally makes no difference which theory is applied except where
(1) the depositor becomes insane and the courts permit his guardian to revoke the
trust by withdrawals to the extent necessary for the depositor's support (trust arises
at deposit); (2) the savings institution is not permitted a right of set-off against the
[Vol. 48
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is questionable authority for the proposition that the Totten trust is valid in
Missouri.
Unfortunately, Heimann's confusing dictum was not resolved by later
decisions that relied on it. 63 To the contrary, recent decisions have relied on
this dictum, without clarification, as authority for the proposition that the
Totten trust is recognized in Missouri.64
2. The Post-1980 Approach
The 1970's were largely years of inactivity for Missouri courts in the
area of the revocable savings account trust. More attention was given to
the joint account as a valid will substitute.65 But beginning in 1980, with
First National Bank of Mexico v. Munns,66 Missouri appellate courts made an
abrupt change in their approach to the Totten trust. Instead of continuing
their pursuit of ever-evasive evidence of the depositor's intent, the courts
focused largely on the form of the deposit. Not only was the title of the
account considered, but emphasis was placed on any agreements executed
in connection with the deposit. These agreements were usually set forth on
the signature card used in both the joint and trust savings accounts.6 7
trust account to satisfy debts owed to it by the depositor (trust arises at deposit); and
(3) where the expenses of the depositor's funeral and administration expenses are
given priority over the beneficiary (trust arises at death). Id § 58.4A, at 541.
63. See, e.g., In re Geel's Estate, 143 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940)
(interpreting Heimann as recognizing revocable savings account trusts, although
under facts of Heimann trust not established for want of proof of definite fund).
64. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1980). One commentator has argued that In re Geel's Estate, 143
S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940), was the first Missouri case to recognize tenta-
tive trusts; Heimann held that the depositor's frequent deposits and withdrawals pre-
vented any implication of trust intent. Note, Tnusts-Tentative Trusts-Joint Bank
Account Payable to Either or Survivor, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 286, 287 (1941).
65. See note 2 supra.
66. 602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
67. Of particular importance to this Comment is the following agreement used
by many Missouri savings and loan associations in connection with the opening of a
savings account trust:
DISCRETIONARY REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT
Trust Agreement No._
The funds in the account indicated on the reverse side of this instru-
ment, together with earnings thereon, and any future additions thereto are
conveyed to the trustee as indicated for the benefit of the beneficiary as
indicated. The conditions of said trust are: (1) The trustee is authorized
to hold, manage, pledge, invest and reinvest said funds in his sole discre-
tion; (2) The undersigned grantor reserves the right to revoke said trust in
part or in full at any time and any partial or complete withdrawal by the
original trustee if he is the grantor shall be a revocation by the grantor to
the extent of such withdrawal, but no other revocation shall be valid un-
less written notice is given to the institution named on the reverse side of
1983]
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In Munns, a woman opened a joint savings account at a savings and
loan association by a deposit in the names of herself, her daughter, and her
son, as 'joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in com-
mon.""8 She deposited the proceeds from the sale of her home. Evidence
was presented that she had intended to reserve the right to use this fund
during her life; at her death it was to be divided equally between the surviv-
ing joint tenants. An agreement, provided by the institution, was executed
by all of the joint tenants at the time the deposit was made, authorizing
each to make withdrawals or pledge the account. The son, without his
mother's knowledge, then withdrew the entire balance of the account and
placed it in a trust account in the same institution, naming himself as
trustee for his mother and sister.6 9 He pledged the trust account as security
for a loan from another institution. On the son's default, the lender
brought an action on his promissory notes, seeking to enforce its security
interest. The beneficiaries intervened. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the lender and ordered the account to be delivered to it.70
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals rejected sev-
eral contentions raised by the beneficiaries. The most important of these,
this card; (3) In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or incompe-
tence of said trustee, is appointed successor trustee, and in
the event of his death, resignation, removal, or incompetence,
is appointed successor trustee, or in the event no successor
trustee is named herein or the successor or successors die, resign, are re-
moved, become incompetent, or fail to act, the institution named on the
reverse side hereof is authorized to appoint a successor trustee, and each
successor trustee shall have the powers of the original trustee; (4) This
trust, subject to the right of revocation, shall continue for the life of the
grantor and thereafter until the beneficiary is - years of age, or until his
death if he dies before such age, and then the proceeds may be delivered
by the association to the beneficiary, or to his heirs, or to the trustee on his
or their behalf, and if the age of the beneficiary is not specified this trust is
for twenty-one years; (5) The institution in which such funds are invested
is authorized to pay the same or to act in any respect affecting said ac-
count before or after the termination of this trust upon the signature of the
trustee and has no responsibility to follow the application of the funds. In
this instrument the singular includes the plural and the masculine in-
cludes the feminine and the neuter.
This _ day of, 19..
Grantor
Boone Nat'l Say. & Loan Ass'n, Columbia, Mo., Discretionary Revocable Trust
Agreement.
68. 602 S.W.2d at 912.
69. Id In opening this savings account trust, the son as grantor executed a
discretionary revocable trust agreement substantially similar to that set forth in
note 67supra. Id. at 912 n.1.
70. Id. at 912.
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for present purposes, were that (1) a Totten trust was not created by the son
since he did not use his own money to open the trust account, and (2) if a




In addressing the first contention, the court recognized the well-settled
Totten trust principle that the son, as depositor, must have used his own
funds when creating the trust. 72 But the court, relying on In re Estate of
LaGarce,7a concluded that the son had been a present joint owner of the
original account"4 and could withdraw all of the funds in the account under
Missouri Revised Statutes sections 369.154 and 369.174. 7 ' LaGarce held
that ajoint account in the form prescribed by section 369.15076 resulted in
the account becoming the property of all of the named joint tenants, rather
than giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of such ownership. 77 The orig-
inal joint depositor in Munns thus invested her son with title to the account
by the mere fact that it was in joint form. Her intent to retain the sole use
of the fund until death was of no consequence. The conclusion, then, is that
Munns, in conjunction with LaGarce, is inconsistent with, and probably
71. Id at 913-14. The beneficiaries also argued that the joint account deposi-
tor's delivery of the certificate of deposit to her son was a bailment, giving the son as
bailee no authority to assign it. The court rejected this argument as not raised at
trial. Id at 913. The beneficiaries next asserted that, under Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 400.3-304 (1978), the pledgee had a duty to inquire of the beneficiaries as to the
trustee's authority to pledge the account and that absent such an inquiry the
pledgee took the pledge subject to the trust. The court held this section inapplica-
ble because the trust certificate of deposit was not a negotiable instrument and
because prior case law regarding a creditor's actual or constructive notice of a
breach of trust had been abrogated by Mo. REV. STAT. § 369.154(2) (1978), which
only required notice of the pledging of a savings and loan trust account to the
association, not the beneficiaries. 602 S.W.2d at 914-15. Finally, the beneficiaries
argued that the pledging of the trust account by the trustee was a breach of trust, so
the pledgee's rights in the account should be subordinate to those of the benefi-
ciaries. The court rejected this contention on the ground that Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 369.154(2) (1978) authorizes the pledging of a savings and loan trust account and,
if notice is given to the association, the pledgee is protected. 602 S.W.2d at 915-16.
For a thorough criticism of the court's analysis, see Joint Savings Accounts: Rights of
Nondepositors While OriginalJoint Tenants Still Alive, 46 Mo. L. REv. 666 (1981).
72. 602 S.W.2d at 913. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
73. 487 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Mo. en banc 1972). The case is discussed in note 2
supra.
74. 602 S.W.2d at 914.
75. (1978).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 369.150 (1969). This section was repealed in 1971 and
has been replaced by id §§ 369.150, .174 (1978). The Afunns court recognized this
fact but also noted that the LaGarce ruling had been reaffirmed in later cases involv-
ing joint accounts within the provisions of these new sections. 602 S.W.2d at 914
n.4.
77. 487 S.W.2d at 500.
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overrules, prior cases in which a similar intention on the part of the joint
account depositor was the basis for finding that a trust had been created.78
Unfortunately for Mrs. Munns, the form of the deposit, not her intent,
controlled.
The form of the deposit was also emphasized when the court addressed
the issue whether the trust account had been revoked by pledge. Although
the court recognized that such a pledge would constitute a "decisive act"
under traditional Totten principles,79 it also relied on the discretionary rev-
ocable trust agreement used in opening the account. The court noted that
without notice to the institution, the depositor/trustee could revoke the
trust only by withdrawal, since those were the terms of the agreement. 80
Written notice of revocation by a pledge was sufficient, however, even
though given by the pledgee rather than the depositor, because the agree-
ment did not specify who must give notice."' The natural implication is
that if no written notice of revocation, other than by withdrawal, had been
given to the institution, the revocation would be invalid regardless of the
depositor/trustee's actual intent. Again the form of the deposit would pre-
vail over the depositor's intent.
Although neither party in the case contended otherwise, the implicit
assumption running throughout Munns is that the Totten trust had been
accepted in Missouri. As authority for this assumption, the court relied on
Frank v Heimann8 2 and those statutes pertaining to savings account trusts in
banks and savings and loan associations.8" As noted earlier, it is doubtful
whether either Heimann or the statutes offer any support for the validity of
the Totten trust in Missouri.
Soon after the decision in Munns, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District, in Blue Valley Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Burrus,
squarely addressed the issue assumed in Munns: is the Totten trust recog-
nized in Missouri? In Burns, like Munns, the depositor opened a savings
account trust in a savings and loan association with a deposit in her name
as trustee for another. At the same time the depositor executed a discretion-
ary revocable trust agreement provided by the institution.8" In rejecting a
78. See, e.g., In re Geel's Estate, 143 S.W.2d 327, 330-31 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940).
79. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 126, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
80. Those terms are typical of discretionary revocable trust agreements used in
Missouri. For a standard form, see note 67 supra. The Munns court also referred to
the requirement of written notice to the savings and loan associations in Mo. REV.
STAT. § 369.154(2) (1978) but noted only that it gave protection to the pledgee
against claims by third parties. 602 S.W.2d at 916.
81. 602 S.W.2d at 916.
82. 302 Mo. 334, 258 S.W. 1000 (en banc 1924).
83. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 362.475, .480 (1978) (banks and trust companies); id
§§ 369.154, .179 (savings and loan associations).
84. 617 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
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claim to the balance of the account by the depositor's executor, the court
held that a valid Totten trust had been created. The named beneficiary
was entitled to the remaining balance of the account at the depositor's
death.86
More important, the court stated that by virtue of the Munns decision,
the Totten trust was recognized in Missouri.8 7 The Burrus court engaged in
no greater analysis than had the Munns court in reaching this conclusion.
Again, no attention was given to those prior cases that made the effect of
the Totten trust in Missouri unclear.8 8 The court relied solely on its inter-
pretation of Munns as holding that, so far as savings and loan institutions
were concerned, the Totten trust had been adopted by Missouri Revised
Statutes section 369.179.89 The Burus court was undaunted by that sec-
tion's express provision that it was not enacted as a determination of the
beneficiary's rights in the account." The court simply interpreted that lan-
guage as "not conclusively vest[ing] title in the beneficiary," thus allowing
evidence that the trust had been revoked.9
The Bunus court's whole-hearted acceptance of Munns seems to include
the new emphasis on the form of deposit over the depositor's actual intent.
Although the question of intent was not an express point of contention in
Burnis, it was inherent in the claim that the Totten trust was invalid as a
testamentary disposition.9 2 The court resolved this issue by referring to the
majority rule that the Totten trust is not subject to attack as an invalid
testamentary disposition, either because a present interest in the account
passes to the beneficiary at the time of deposit or because of the social util-
ity of this device and the unlikelihood of fraud.9" Conspicuously absent
86. 617 S.W.2d at 113-14.
87. Id
88. See Part II.B.l supra.
89. (1978). See 617 S.W.2d at 113.
90. The provision states that it does not attempt to make a determination "of
the rights of persons interested in such account as between themselves." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 369.179.4(3) (1978).
91. 617 S.W.2d at 114. By its interpretation of § 369.179, the Burrus court de-
rived a positive inference of validity of the Totten trust from the statute's indiffer-
ence to the beneficiary's rights in the account. But the court did not justify this
inference, which is questionable in light of prior Missouri cases. The analysis seems
to be that Munns held that the Totten trust doctrine was adopted in Missouri by
§ 369.179, and while § 369.179 does not determine any person's rights in the trust
account, this does not affect the Munns holding. This analysis seems weak, espe-
cially since no attempt was made to reconcile or even address prior case law. The
court noted that Florida courts had reached a similar conclusion in Seymour v.
Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956). But Seymour was the first Florida case to
address the Totten trust question, so there was no need to comment on the confused
state of prior cases.
92. 617 S.W.2d at 114.
93. Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment b (1959)
17
McPhail: McPhail: Missouri's Totten Trust Doctrine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
from the court's analysis is any discussion of the testator's intent as evi-
denced by his acts and statements. 94 If there was any question about that
intent, the court apparently deemed a recitation of the form of the deposit,
including the accompanying trust agreement, dispositive of that issue.
As a result of Munns and its progeny, it is clear that some sort of revoca-
ble savings account trust is effective in Missouri as a will substitute.9 5 It is
unclear, however, whether Missouri has truly adopted the Totten trust doc-
trine as originally pronounced by the New York courts or whether it has
developed a "radical innovation" of its own.
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFTER MUNNS: AN
ABERRATION OF ToTrEN?
Uncertainty whether the Totten trust has been adopted in Missouri is
due largely to the widespread use in the state of the Discretionary Revoca-
ble Trust Agreement (DRTA).9" The recent Missouri cases that purport to
recognize the Totten trust have usually involved the execution of this type
of agreement when the account is opened.97 The problem is that the
(courts uphold trust as valid because it is a convenient method of disposing of
money); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 47, at 343
(2d ed. 1965) (courts nearly unanimous in holding that beneficiary has present de-
feasible interest in account); I A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 527 (theory of
present defeasible interest is tenuous, but social utility and unlikelihood of fraud
warrant upholding trust). The Buris court concluded its discussion of the testa-
mentary disposition issue by stating that the beneficiary had acquired a defeasible
interest in the account at the moment of creation. 617 S.W.2d at 114. Although
this position coincides with the traditional New York view as articulated by Profes-
sor Scott, it is irreconcilable with the implication of Frank v. Heimann, 302 Mo.
334, 348, 258 S.W. 1000, 1004 (en banc 1924), that no trust arises until the deposi-
tor's death. See note 62 and accompanying text supra; e Silk v. Silk, 162 Misc. 773,
774, 295 N.Y.S. 517, 519-20 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (beneficiary has sufficient interest in
account to bring action for injury to property based on fraud or duress while settlor
still alive). But see Spain v. Madam Laura, 621 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. App., E.D.
1981) (beneficiary had no standing to sue divine healer for money had and received
when depositor/trustee withdrew trust account funds to pay for "treatments").
94. If such evidence was available, the court made a distinct change in ap-
proach from prior cases by not addressing it. See notes 48-50 and accompanying
text supra.
95. Cf Spain v. Madam Laura, 621 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981)
(discretionary revocable trust account not expressly denominated "Totten trust"
but revoked by depositor's total withdrawal).
96. A typical, standardized DRTA, widely used in Missouri, is reproduced in
note 67 supra.
97. Spain v. Madam Laura, 621 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Blue Val-
ley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); First
Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980). There has
been one exception. The decision in Willman v. Phelps, 631 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1982), does not indicate that any trust agreement was executed; the court re-
[Vol. 48
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DRTA varies somewhat from traditional Totten principles. For example,
the DRTA typically allows the depositor/trustee to provide that the trust
be continued even after his death. This is accomplished by two provisions
in the DRTA. One states that the trust shall continue after the depositor's
death until the beneficiary has reached a specified age;98 the other provides
for the appointment of a successor trustee who will have the same powers as
the depositor/trustee. 99 While these provisions allow the depositor greater
flexibility in using the savings account trust as a will substitute, they seem
to conflict with the traditional Totten concept that the beneficiary is enti-
tled to the balance of the account at the depositor's death. 00
A more direct conflict is found in the DRTA provision that in the
event a beneficiary dies before reaching a specified age, the institution may
deliver the proceeds of the account to the beneficiary's heirs or to the trustee
on their behalf."0 1 The Totten trust, on the other hand, provides that if the
beneficiary predeceases the depositor, the trust is terminated and the pro-
ceeds are included in the depositor's estate.10 2 Finally, the DRTA declares
that unless the savings institution is given notice of any revocation other
than by withdrawal, the revocation will be invalid,'0° while a Totten trust
can be revoked by any "decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance."'
0 4
With these variations in mind, an interpretation of Missouri's current
lied on simple Totten principles. The case is discussed in notes 108-10 and accom-
panying text inf/a.
98. The DRTA set forth in note 67 supra provides: "This trust shall continue
for the life of the grantor and thereafter until the beneficiary is - years of age
. " Cf Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 112
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (DRTA provided that trust would continue until benefici-
ary was 66, but beneficiary was 66 when account was opened).
99. This provision, also included in the DRTA set forth in note 67 supra,
reserves a power of appointment of successor trustees in the depositor and further
provides that the savings institution may appoint a successor trustee in the event
that no successor trustee was named by the depositor or that the appointment fails
because of the successor's death, resignation, removal, incompetence, or failure to
act.
100. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959); 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 7, § 58.3, at 527.
101. The DRTA set forth in note 67 supra provides that "the proceeds may be
delivered by the association to the beneficiary or his heirs, or to the trustee on his or
their behalf."
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959); 1 A. SCOTT,
supra note 7, § 58.4, at 536-37.
103. The DRTA set forth in note 67supra provides that "any partial or complete
withdrawal by the original trustee if he is the grantor shall be a revocation by the
grantor to the extent of such withdrawal, but no other revocation shall be valid
unless written notice is given to the institution."
104. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959); 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 7,
§ 58.4, at 535-36.
1983]
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approach to the Totten trust requires an attempt to ascertain the role the
DRTA has played in recent decisions. In light of current case law, this
attempt admittedly is speculative.'0 5 Any definitive answer must await a
decision where the variations of the DRTA are reconciled with traditional
Totten concepts."' Still, a few observations may safely be made.
First, the DRTA has had at least some influence in the recent Missouri
decisions purporting to adopt the Totten trust doctrine. This is indicated
by various references in Munns to the DRTA involved in that case.10 7 Sec-
ond, it may be unjustified to say that the validity of the Totten trust in
Missouri depends on the use of the DRTA. Third, the use of the DRTA
seems to be viewed by the courts as part of the form of the deposit, adding
strength to the presumption that a revocable trust was intended.
These last two observations are based on the logical consequences of
the recent case of Willman v. Phelps.l ' The depositor in Phelps was a Flor-
ida resident who had opened several savings account trusts in Florida insti-
tutions. These deposits were made in the traditional form-A in trust for
B-without a DRTA or any other trust instrument. A Missouri resident
was the named beneficiary.' 9 In resolving the beneficiary's claim to the
accounts, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District noted that
a possible conflicts of law issue existed. The court found that issue moot,
however, by stating that Missouri and Florida laws on Totten trusts are the
same. 110
105. The recent Missouri cases explicitly or implicitly purporting to adopt the
Totten trust doctrine have not stated expressly the manner in which they view the
DRTA. See Spain v. Madam Laura, 621 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Blue
Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d I1I (Mo. App., W.D. 1981);
First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
106. The problem would arise where the depositor attempts to revoke the trust
by will without notifying the savings institution. An Illinois court has already de-
cided such a case. In In re Estate of Anderson, 69 111. App. 2d 352, 217 N.E.2d 444
(1966), the court held that no Totten trust is created when additional terms are
expressed by a DRTA and that the revocation was ineffective without notice to the
institution. Id at 364-65, 217 N.E.2d at 451.
107. 602 S.W.2d at 916. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
108. 631 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
109. Id at 64-65.
110. Id at 65 n.2. An argument can be made, however, that Florida's approach
to the Totten trust is not the same as Missouri's. First, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.075
(West Supp. 1983) provides that a trust shall not be deemed invalid as a testamen-
tary disposition because the settlor reserved such powers as the right to withdraw or
add to the principal, the right of revocation, or the right to appoint a successor
trustee-i.e., many of the powers found in the DRTA. The section further provides
that a savings account trust is excluded from the requirement that all trusts be
executed in the same manner as a will. Missouri has no comparable statute. Sec-
ond, Florida courts already had held that a deposit in the form of "4 in trust for B"
alone would give rise to a presumption that a revocable trust was intended. See
Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956). But Missouri courts, in the
[Vol. 48
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Assuming the correctness of this statement,"' Florida case law should
prove instructive. Florida originally adopted the Totten trust doctrine in its
traditional form." 12 Later, however, it was held that a Totten trust can also
be created by the execution of a DRTA when an account is opened.' 1 3 The
DRTA, or any other written declaration by the depositor," 4 removes any
ambiguity about the depositor's intent."i5 The presumption in favor of a
revocable trust is strengthened. The person challenging the trust cannot
prove by parol evidence that no trust was intended; he must show that the
depositor did not read or understand the declarations." 6
absence of a DRTA, did not engage in any presumption of revocability when
presented with a deposit in this form. See., e.g., Frank v. Heimann, 302 Mo. 334, 258
S.W. 1000 (en banc 1924). Third, if the Phelps ruling is based on First Nat'l Bank of
Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), it may be further argued
that Missouri had not adopted the Totten trust doctrine because Munns did not
involve a Totten trust.
111. If the Phelps court was wrong on this point, the case still may be read as
correctly decided under Florida law. Generally, when a depositor creates a savings
account trust in the state in which he is then domiciled, and he subsequently dies in
another state, the validity of the trust is governed by the law of the state in which
the deposit was made. See United States v. Williams, 160 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D.N.J.
1958); cf Rozycke v. Sroka, 3 111. App. 3d 741, 744, 279 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1972) (law
of situs of joint deposit applied, but identical to forum law); In re Estate of Bonness,
13 Wash. App. 299, 312, 535 P.2d 823, 831 (1975) (suggesting that law of situs of
deposit should be applied, but finding it identical to forum law). But see Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 1240, 1243 (1952) (impossible to derive uniform choice of law rule from
cases).
112. See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956).
113. See First Nat'l Bank of Tampa v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 So. 2d
211, 212-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
114. In Litsey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Tampa, 243 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971), the court did not state that a DRTA was involved but did
indicate that the depositor had signed a declaration when opening the account "to
the effect that upon the death of the trustee the account and other rights would be
paid to said beneficiary." Id at 240.
115. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. The court in Litsey v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n of Tampa, 243 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), indicated
this when it addressed the burden of proof issue as to the depositor's intent. The
depositor's executor had presented testimony that the depositor had only created
the trust accounts in order to take advantage of insurance limits on account bal-
ances. On appeal, the executor contended that the trial court erred by imposing a
higher burden of proof as to the depositor's actual intent when a written declaration
is involved than when an account is standing alone. This contention was rejected.
Id at 243. The court relied on Cohen v. Newton Say. Bank, 320 Mass. 90, 67
N.E.2d 748 (1946), in which the court had held the usual Massachusetts rule-that
notice to the beneficiary was required for the creation of a valid trust-inapplicable
because the depositor had signed a card when opening a savings account trust that
clearly set out his intent and the terms of the trust. Id at 92-93, 67 N.E.2d at 750.
116. See Litsey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Tampa, 243 So. 2d 239, 242-44
1983]
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On the basis of these observations, a case may be made that two types
of revocable savings account trusts are recognized in Missouri. First, there
is the trust involving a DRTA, which for the sake of clarity will be referred
to as a Munns trust. Although its validity is sustained by reference to Tol-
len,11 7 the Munns trust has several distinctive characteristics. Because the
Munns trust has unambiguous written terms so far as the depositor's intent
is concerned,"' any oral statements made by the depositor prior to or at the
time of execution of the agreement that would contradict those terms would
be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule." 9 In other words, the
Munns trust severely limits the traditional Totten trust rule that any extrin-
sic evidence concerning the depositor's intent is admissible. The Munns
trust also entails the previously mentioned variations provided by the
DRTA, e.g., postponement of the beneficiaries' rights in the account, pre-
vention of termination by the death of the beneficiary, and limited revoca-
tion without notice to the institution.
The second type is the traditional Totten trust. Its validity in Missouri
hinges on the correctness of the Phelps court's assertion that Missouri law is
identical with that of Florida. Since the limited terms "A in trust for B" are
ambiguous, parol evidence as to the depositor's intent is admissible. 2 ' Al-
though this extrinsic evidence will be admitted, however, courts in other
jurisdictions have given little weight to unsupported oral statements of the
depositor's intent121
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (approving practice of weighing written declarations of
intent against parol evidence and noting that trial court found no evidence deposi-
tor did not read or understand declarations on signature card).
117. See Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113-14
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910, 913
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
118. The provisions of the DRTA set forth in note 67 supra indicate that the
depositor who uses it intends to create a revocable savings account trust. Situations
may arise, however, in which the depositor's intent as to other matters may not
clearly be shown by the DRTA, such as who the intended beneficiary is. See Estate
of Hall v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 30 Colo. App. 296, -, 491 P.2d 614, 615-
17 (1971) (DRTA named "Boys Town of Nebraska" as beneficiary, but no entity
existed under that name; parol evidence admissible to show intent).
119. See 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 38, at 301-02.
120. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
121. Some courts seem to have developed a rule that little weight will be given
to proof of oral revocation of a Totten trust. Courts worry that basing a finding of
revocation on such proof "would permit frail oral memory years later to overcome
the clear terms of the Totten Trusts." In re Deneff's Will, 44 Misc. 2d 947, 949-50,
255 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349-50 (Sur. Ct. 1964). See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 487, 522-24
(1972); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1259-60 (1954). Although the rule was devel-
oped in the context of whether a Totten trust had been revoked, it has been applied
to proof by oral statements that the depositor did not intend to create a trust. See
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V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF THE MUNNS TRUST
If the Munns trust is to be an effective will substitute in Missouri, some
difficult arguments against its validity must eventually be reconciled-ar-
guments in addition to the trust's tenuous foundation of questionable
precedent.
The first argument is that there is a conflict between the DRTA and
traditional Totten principles. The statements in Munns and Burs to the
effect that the Totten trust has been adopted in Missouri are purely
dicta.' 2 2 Neither case involved a Totten trust. The trust in Totten was a
deposit in trust for another "standing alone."' 23 In both Munns and Burrus
the deposit was not standing alone but was accompanied by the DRTA.
Several jurisdictions have enforced the Totten language literally, holding
that the use of the DRTA actually prevents any finding of a Totten trust.'
24
Ignoring the Toten principles, these courts treat the DRTA in the same
manner as any other express inter vivos trust. Problems center particularly
on the issues of revocation1 25 and the trust's illusory' 26 or testamentary na-
122. See Blue Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910, 913
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
123. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
124. See, e.g., In re Estate of Capocy, 102 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612, 430 N.E.2d 1131,
1133 (1981); In re Estate of Anderson, 69 111. App. 2d 352, 363, 217 N.E.2d 444, 449
(1966); May v. Safer, 46 Mich. App. 668, 675, 208 N.W.2d 619, 623 (1973); Funk v.
Funk, 24 Wash. App. 19, 22, 598 P.2d 792, 795 (1979); cf. Bumbaugh v. Burns, 635
S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (DRTA involved, but Totten principles
held inapplicable because more than one depositor/trustee).
125. The depositor's intent to revoke may be frustrated where the revocation is
attempted by will without notice to the institution, for such revocation is invalid
under the DRTA but valid under the Totten trust doctrine if the bequest is suffi-
ciently specific. See In re Estate of Anderson, 69 Ill. App. 2d 352, 361-65, 217 N.E.2d
444, 448-50 (1966).
126. Attacks on a trust as "illusory" are usually made by a settlor's spouse who
has been deprived of the property even though the depositor kept control of it dur-
ing his life. See 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 58.5, at 544. There is some authority for
the proposition that Totten trusts are immune from this attack. See, e.g., In re Hal-
pern, 303 N.Y. 33, 37-39, 100 N.E.2d 120, 121-22 (1951). Thus, if the DRTA is not
a Totten trust but an express inter vivos trust, it theoretically would be vulnerable
to a surviving spouse's claim that it is illusory. But Professor Scott has criticized the
Halpem case, see 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 7, § 58.5, at 547, and the theory does not
hold up well in practice. In Illinois, for example, the Totten trust is per se invalid as
to the surviving spouse's rights while an inter vivos trust such as the DRTA is con-
sidered illusory only after the surrounding facts and circumstances are considered.
See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 356-57, 383 N.E.2d 185, 191
(1978); In re Estate of Prusis, 105 Ill. App. 3d 494, 499-501, 434 N.E.2d 443, 446
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ture;12 7 as a result, the intended effect of the trust is often frustrated. Other
jurisdictions, however, have ignored the "standing alone" requirement.
Like Munns and Burrus, these cases hold that a DRTA creates a Totten
trust. 128
This argument is the most difficult to reconcile, especially if it arises in
a case in which the terms of the DRTA conflict with traditional Totten
trust principles. In that instance, the courts will have to decide which takes
precedence. Another alternative is available, however. The "standing
alone" requirement could be recognized for Totten trusts, accompanied by
an interpretation of Munns and Burrus as involving express inter vivos trusts.
Consequently, the whole issue whether the Totten trust is recognized in
Missouri could be decided anew.
A second argument is that at least one court has found that certain
provisions of the DRTA violate the statute of uses. In Ward v. Saranac Federal
Savings and Loan Association,' 2 9 a New York court stated that a DRTA, simi-
lar to that involved in Munns,"3 ° created a passive trust. 3 ' More specifi-
cally, the court objected to the fact that the DRTA permitted the savings
institution to appoint a successor trustee at the depositor/trustee's death.
The successor's only duty would be to hold the trust property until the ben-
eficiary attained a specific age. These provisions, combined with the fact
that the successor practically would be given legal title to the account by a
provision giving him all the powers of the original trustee, conferred no
active duty on the successor.' 32 But the Ward court did not explain why it
127. See, e.g., Ward v. Saranac Lake Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 48 A.D.2d 337,
338-39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542-43 (1975) (DRTA provision specifying age at which
beneficiary's interest would vest rendered trust inconsistent with Totten principles
and invalid as testamentary disposition).
128. See, e.g., Reidy v. Almich, 4 Ariz. App. 144, 147, 418 P.2d 390, 393 (1966);
First Nat'l Bank of Tampa v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 211, 212-13
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Jones v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 142 Ga. App. 18, 20,
234 S.E.2d 794, 795-96 (1977); Leader Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Memphis v. Ham-
ilton, 46 Tenn. App. 368, 371, 384, 330 S.W.2d 33, 35, 41 (1959).
129. 48 A.D.2d 337, 369 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1975).
130. The difference between the two is largely in the description of the powers
reserved by the depositor/settler and those granted to the depositor/trustee. In
Ward, the DRTA simply stated that the account was given to the trustee for the
following purposes:
To withdraw and transfer the same in whole or in part and to exercise full
control over the participation value thereof as though the account were
held absolutely free and discharged of any trust, and without obligation
on the part of the Association to look to the application of the fund.
Id at 338, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 541. This language can be compared with conditions (1)
and (2) of the standard DRTA set forth in note 67supra, which are more specific as
to the trustee's duties.
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objected only to the DRTA's provision for appointment of a successor
trustee. All Totten trusts arguably are passive. Where the trustee is the
original depositor, however, this argument may be countered by the asser-
tion that the Totten trust's utility requires the suspension of traditional
trust principles.1 33 The Ward court apparently determined that this social
utility argument did not justify deferment of the beneficiary's interest by a
successor trustee for no apparent reason.
1 34
A similar problem exists under Missouri law. Although the Missouri
statute of uses excludes personal property, 35 Missouri courts have stated
that "[o]n the analogy of the Statutes of Uses, and on separate principles of
equity, a passive trust of personalty also is deemed executed."' 3 6 Even
though the DRTA involved in Munns and Bums recited that various powers
were conferred on the trustee, the fact remains that any successor trustee
would merely hold the trust property for the beneficiary; it is hard to define
any active duty on the part of the successor trustee.
1 3 7
The response to this passive trust argument is that at least one Missouri
court has already recognized that the utility of this type of trust requires the
suspension of traditional trust concepts.' 38 Moreover, if the depositor's
creditors are able to reach the account' 39 and the depositor is not escaping




Finally, there is an argument that the Munns trust permits the deposi-
133. This is the argument advanced by Professor Scott. See I A. SCOTr, supra
note 7, § 58.3, at 527.
134. 48 A.D.2d at 339-40, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43.
135. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.020 (1978).
136. Penney v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632, 640-41 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
137. The problem in defining any active duties of the successor trustee arises
from the fact that the DRTA is deemed to be a Totten trust. See Blue Valley Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981). If the
successor trustee actually is given active duties by virtue of condition (1) of the
DRTA set forth in note 67 supra, his exercise of any of these duties would work a
revocation of the trust under Totten principles.
138. See Blue Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burrus, 617 S.W.2d 111, 113
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (Totten trust doctrine created so popular trust account
would not be forced into traditional trust mold).
139. See 1 A. ScoTTr, supra note 7, § 58.5, at 543.
140. See Note, supra note 18, at 695 (Totten trust is incomplete transfer for fed-
eral tax purposes).
141. There may be some prejudice to the beneficiary's creditors, however, de-
pending on when the trust is executed and legal title to the account is vested in the
beneficiary. If the trust is not executed when the successor trustee takes over, the
beneficiary's creditors would be placed in a worse position than if the depositor had
disposed of the funds by will or intestacy. On the other hand, if the trust is exe-
cuted as passive while the depositor/trustee is alive, the resulting access of the bene-
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tor to dispose of his funds in a manner that could not be effected by will.
Essentially, the depositor is conveying an absolute interest in the funds, sim-
ilar to that of a fee simple in land, to the trustee. This interest is limited,
however, by a gift over to the beneficiary of any remaining funds at the
trustee's death. A majority of courts take the position that "[i]f a fee simple
in land or a like interest in personalty is given, coupled with an absolute
power of disposal by deed or will,. . . a gift over in the same instrument of
what remains undisposed of is void."' 4 2 Thus, if the depositor should
choose to dispose of his funds in a similar manner by will rather than by
revocable savings account trust, the beneficiary would receive nothing since
the gift over would be void.i 43 Missouri has followed the majority rule, at
least so far as land is concerned. i44
The response to this argument is that the reason for the rule is not
present in the Munns trust situation. One reason traditionally given for the
rule where personalty is involved is that the gift over is too indefinite.' 4 But
in the Munns trust situation the gift over, i.e., the remaining balance in the
account at the trustee's death, is readily ascertainable, so the gift over ar-
guably should not be void. 146
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is open to debate whether the
Totten trust has been adopted in Missouri. The most tenable position at
the present time is that Missouri is applying the Totten doctrine with its
own innovations. Since the Missouri Supreme Court has failed to squarely
address the issue, and in the absence of any legislation regarding the rights
of beneficiaries, the Totten trust is not recommended as a will substitute in
Missouri. This is especially true since a similar effect can be achieved with
ajoint savings account so long as the depositor retains control over the bank
book. 14
7
142. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1482, at 355
(2d ed. 1956).
143. In Fox v. Snow, 6 NJ. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950), the testatrix bequeathed all
of her money on deposit at the savings institution to her husband with a gift over to
her niece of any remaining funds in the account at the husband's death. The court
held that the husband took absolute ownership and that the gift over was void. Id
at 13, 76 A.2d at 877.
144. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 473, 235 S.W.2d 328, 331
(1950). See also Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 195O-Property, 16
Mo. L. REv. 372, 388 (1951); Executoy Limitations Following Power of Disposal, 17
Mo. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (1952).
145. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 142, § 1485, at 369.
146. See id at 370 (arguing that indefiniteness presents issue of proof, not reason
for invalidating gift over which can be ascertained).
147. The depositor, however, may dispose of his money sooner than intended if
the joint tenant is given access to the account. The depositor discovered this, to her
[Vol. 48
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TO 7TEN TRUSTS
Because the Totten trust more readily comports with the needs of a
depositor desiring a will substitute, the doctrine's utility demands that the
law in Missouri be clarified in its favor. Since the Totten trust is a creature
ofjudicial decision, the responsibility for clarification lies primarily with the
courts. Prior cases that seem to impeach the doctrine's validity should be
expressly discredited. A definite choice should be made whether the DRTA
is to be treated as an inter vivos trust or incorporated into the Totten trust
doctrine.
Missouri courts probably will not have an opportunity to clarify their
position on the Totten trust before legislation resolves the confusion. Arti-
cle VI of the Uniform Probate Code,' 48 pertaining to multiple party ac-
counts, is currently under consideration by the legislature.' 4 9 Enactment of
this legislation will mean a complete recognition of the Totten trust in Mis-
souri, 5 ' an improvement over current statutes that do not determine rights
under savings account trusts. Enactment of Article VI will also resolve the
dismay, in First Nat'l Bank of Mexico v. Munns, 602 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App., E.D.
1980).
148. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101 to 6-201 (1975).
149. H.R. 117, 82d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1982). Several states already
have enacted Article VI of the Uniform Probate Code. See ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.31.005-.070 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6101 to -6201 (1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-15-101 to -202 (1973 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 560:6-101 to -113 (1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-6-101 to -201 (1979);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 6-101 to -201 (1981 & Supp. 1982-1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 528.01-.16 (West 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2701 to -2714
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-6-101 to -201 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-31-
01 to -14 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-6-101 to -201 (1978).
150. There are two key provisions of Article VI for purposes of recognizing the
Totten trust. The first addresses the effect of the trust account while the depositor
and beneficiary are still alive:
Unless a contrary intent is manifested by the terms of the account or
the deposit agreement or there is other clear and convincing evidence of
an irrevocable trust, a trust account belongs beneficially to the trustee
during his lifetime .... If there is an irrevocable trust, the account be-
longs beneficially to the beneficiary.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-103(c) (1975). If there are two or more named trustees,
then the account belongs beneficially to both in proportion to their net contribu-
tions to the account. See id. § 6-103(a), (c). The second provision addresses the
effect of the trust account when the depositor/trustee predeceases the beneficiary:
If the account is a trust account. . . [o]n death of the sole trustee or
the survivor of 2 or more trustees, any sums remaining on deposit belong
to the person or persons named as beneficiaries, if surviving, or to the
survivor of them if one or more die before the trustee, unless there is clear
evidence of a contrary intent; if 2 or more beneficiaries survive, there is no
right of survivorship in event of death of any beneficiary thereafter unless
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irony that the payable on death account is invalid in Missouri even though
its effect is virtually identical to that of a Totten trust.' 5 1 Such a clearing of
the clouds surrounding the use of the savings account as a will substitute in
Missouri will carry forward the current trend of freeing the modest estate
from the confines of probate.
KENDALL R. MCPHAIL
Id § 6-104(c). Any transfers as a result of§ 6-104 are not to be considered as testa-
mentary dispositions. Id § 6-106.
151. Article VI provides that the payable on death (POD) account is to have the
same effect as the trust account. The POD account belongs to the depositor during
his lifetime. Id § 6-103(b). Any sums remaining in the account at the depositor's
death belong to the POD payee if he survives the depositor. Id § 6-104(b). Finally,
the POD account is not invalid as a testamentary disposition. Id § 6-106.
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